

THE VIOLENCE OF THE POLITICAL AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE:
DIRTY HANDS RECONSIDERED

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Connections between Sartre's literary and dramatic writings and his philosophical work are frequently noted but seldom elaborated. The recent surge of scholarship on the question of political violence in Sartre warrants another look at the creative work that deals with this question most explicitly, his 1948 play *Dirty Hands*.

More than perhaps anything else, Sartre was a philosopher of situation. If we take up the question of political violence in Sartre's philosophy, we must ground the analysis in an understanding of the concrete political problems of his time. The aim of this essay is to trace the development of Sartre's evolving thought on political violence from the perspective of the issues confronting him in his particular context—the “historical logic” of his position, to borrow Aronson's phrase.¹ I therefore leave to one side the more abstract (and I do not mean this pejoratively) question of whether or not violence can be “authentic” in the sense laid out in *Being and Nothingness*, and for this reason I do not address the theoretical reflections on violence given in the *Notebooks for an Ethics*. Instead, I focus on a question that consumed Sartre in the latter half of his life (along with much of the contemporary French left): To what extent is violent action a necessary condition of radical political change?

My conclusion is that through a long, dialectical process, Sartre arrives at a position that refuses both bourgeois humanism with its disavowal of violence *and* what I call Official Communism, the prevailing Manichean politics of his day and the institutionalized repression

¹ Ronald Aronson, “Camus and Sartre on Violence—the Unresolved Conflict,” in *Journal of Romance Studies* 6, no. 1 & 2 (2006): 67-77.

that went along with it. In other words, he affirms the violence of the political without by that token affirming the politics of violence. This is the position, I argue, that is dramatically represented in “Dirty Hands.” Interestingly, the play appeared in 1948, fairly early on in the development of Sartre’s political ideas. I claim that, in this work, Sartre presages his position with regard to politics and violence that would only become philosophically explicit at the conclusion of a long series of debates with Merleau-Ponty, Camus, and the orthodox Marxism of his time. It is the development and result of these conversations, and their manifestation in *Dirty Hands*, that I hope to articulate here.

Dirty Hands

Dirty Hands is the story of Hugo, a young intellectual and member of a revolutionary party who anxiously volunteers for the task of assassinating Hoederer, a high-level party official who has opted for strategic collusion with the nationalists and royalists. Hoederer must die, the conspirators’ line of thinking goes, so that the party will not risk compromising its revolutionary principles in the name of reformist collaboration with class enemies. The play begins near the end of the narrative, with Hugo’s release from a stint in prison for the murder of Hoederer. Upon his release, he visits an old comrade, Olga, and it becomes clear that the party now has him marked for death; they have sent him poisoned food while in prison, and assassins are now on their way to finish the job. Olga asks Hugo to tell the story of how he came to kill Hoederer; only then, when she knows his true motives, will she be able to determine if he is “salvageable” (i.e. potentially still useful to the Party) and thus save his life. From the first act, then, the audience is confronted with two questions: Under what circumstances did Hugo kill Hoederer? And why does the party now want him dead?

We flash-back three years. Hugo moves with his wife Jessica into Hoederer's home and assumes the job of secretary (a ploy by the conspirators to get the two men in close enough proximity). He has a finite amount of time to carry out his mission. One of the central conflicts of the play is Hugo's moral dilemma as he precariously balances his loyalty to the party and its ideas with the brutal action that these commitments require. On one level, he believes the party is right to assassinate Hoederer, as his activities are essentially counter-revolutionary; on another, he suffers something of a crisis of conscience when confronted with the reality of actually pulling the trigger and ending another human being's life—a human being, moreover, that he grows to admire. Much is made of Hugo's bourgeois, academic background: he comes from a privileged position and has never had to *live* the violence of the class struggle. He is consequently stricken with a kind of squeamish and delicate reluctance to do what he knows “objectively” to be the right course of action: “[Hoederer] drinks, he smokes, he speaks to me of the party, he makes plans, and I—I think only of the corpse he is going to be; it's obscene. Did you notice his eyes?”² The assassination is his attempt to prove himself a worthy member of the revolutionary party, but he cannot let go of the sheltered and bloodless world of his origins so easily. There are constant references throughout the play to the disparity between “play-acting” and “real life,” especially in Hugo's conversations with (the equally bourgeois) Jessica.³ The young revolutionary worries that his dedication to the party and its mission has hitherto betrayed an affected romanticism, excusing itself from the ugly necessities of political action. Agreeing that Hoederer must die is one thing; killing him under the spell of his eyes is something else.

The play's centerpiece is a long debate between Hugo and Hoederer concerning the relation between political exigency and party ideology. Hugo criticizes Hoederer for sacrificing

² Jean-Paul Sartre, *Dirty Hands*, trans. Lionel Abel, in *No Exit and Three Other Plays* (New York: Vintage International, 1989), 207.

³ See *ibid*, 154-156, 182, 199. This is also an important theme in Sartre's play *Kean*.

the latter in the name of the former, collaborating with class enemies in a deceitful and cynical power play. Hoederer sees this criticism as an idealistic naïveté rooted in Hugo's bourgeois background, arguing that the business of politics is the consolidation of power by whatever means available:

Hoederer: A party is always only a tool. It has only one goal: power.

Hugo: It has only one goal: to make our ideas, all our ideas, and only these victorious.

Hoederer: That's true. Now you—you have ideas. You'll get over them.⁴

Hoederer: I'll lie when I must, and I have contempt for no one. I wasn't the one who invented lying. It grew out of a society divided into classes, and each one of us has inherited it from birth. We shall not abolish lying by refusing to tell lies, but by using every means at hand to abolish classes.

Hugo: All means are not good.

Hoederer: All means are good when they're effective.⁵

This confrontation between Hugo's intellectual devotion to revolutionary ideology and Hoederer's pragmatic opportunism is related to but distinct from the former's humanistic qualms about assassinating his opponent. No participant in *this* debate is a moralizing humanist who disavows violent action; the opposing sides differ only as to the motive for and the nature of political violence. Hugo believes in revolutionary violence, (despite his reluctance to actually go through with it), but *not* in the unscrupulous opportunism of Hoederer. There are therefore at least two points of contention raised in this play, one concerning violence and the liberal humanist impulse, one concerning ideological fidelity and Party allegiance.

Finally, Hugo completes his task almost by accident, owing to a misunderstanding: he discovers Hoederer in a compromising position with Jessica and shoots him on the spot. Returning from the flashback, Olga is relieved at the conclusion of Hugo's story; he is "salvageable" after all. She explains that the party has adopted the policy of collaboration with the nationalists and royalists, and that Hoederer is now venerated as a martyr. Hugo is marked

⁴ Ibid, 217.

⁵ Ibid, 218.

out for death precisely because of his success in the assassination. But since his crime was committed in a fit of jealous passion and not for ideological reasons (or at least since they can spin it this way), he can be rehabilitated and the party can once again make use of him. It is at this point that Hugo, shaken and unsettled by this revelation, has a dramatic moment of clarity:

Hugo: I don't know why I killed Hoederer, but I know why it was right to kill him: because his policy was wrong, because he lied to the rank and file and jeopardized the life of the party...And now you want me to dishonor myself even more and to agree that I killed him for nothing. Olga, what I thought about Hoederer's line I continue to think.⁶

Our troubled hero has not “gotten over” his ideas after all. He thus declines to be “rehabilitated” by the party that has betrayed, to his mind, both him and the revolutionary praxis to which he is committed. In a final act of defiance and protest, Hugo brazenly leaves Olga's room to confront his approaching assassins. As a last word, he sums up both his position within the party and his pronouncement on its politics: “Unsalvageable!”

Dirty Hands scandalized the Marxist-leaning left, especially the PCF, who saw it as a reactionary spectacle. A young Marguerite Duras jibed that it existed only to “satisfy a (bourgeois) public's appetite for voyeurism.”⁷ Sartre maintained that this interpretation ran contrary to his intentions, and refused to authorize future performances of the play to avoid further *malentendus*.⁸ But what does the work actually say about political violence in the context of revolutionary praxis? It should be clear even from this cursory synopsis that its “message” is not immediately transparent. Because *Dirty Hands* deals explicitly with issues of Marxist theory and communist politics, we must say more about Sartre's perspective on these issues in order to understand what the play means for the issue of political violence.

⁶ Ibid, 240-241.

⁷ Quoted in Robert Wilcocks, *Jean Paul Sartre: A Bibliography of International Criticism* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1975), 198. Translation mine.

⁸ See Adrian van den Hoven, “Sartre's Conception of Historicity and Temporality: The Quest for a Motive in Camus' *The Stranger* and Sartre's *Dirty Hands*,” in *Sartre Studies International* 11, no. 1 & 2 (2005), 214.

Sartre and Marxism

Questions such as “Is so-and-so a Marxist?” and “Is so-and-so a communist?” are difficult to approach, most of all because it is not abundantly clear what the terms “Marxist” or “communist” mean in every context. The situation was especially confusing in postwar Parisian intellectual circles, where “communist” would probably have meant someone who belongs to the PCF and therefore actively supports the U.S.S.R., and “Marxist” someone who believes in an objectively pre-determined logic writ into the fabric of events and leading inexorably to a classless society. Today these are not necessary requirements for the attribution of such labels, and we might mark differences between communism and the government of the Soviet Union, or between the “orthodox” tradition and more sophisticated Marxist analyses. Such lines were more difficult to draw during the early years of *Les Temps modernes*. We must therefore keep context closely in mind when, for instance, Merleau-Ponty claims that Sartre is not a Marxist⁹ (and vice versa).¹⁰ The same rule applies when Sartre refers to “the communists” in a distancing third-person tone in the “Existentialism is a Humanism” lecture,¹¹ in *Search for a Method* when he speaks of existentialism as a “parasitical ideology” that will be “absorbed, surpassed, and conserved” by Marxism,¹² and finally, in the “Self Portrait at Seventy” interview, when he tells

⁹ “Sartre never was a Marxist.” See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosophy of Existence,” trans. Allen S. Weiss, in *The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty*, ed. Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 501.

¹⁰ “[Merleau-Ponty] was not, however, a Marxist: he did not reject the Marxist idea but he rejected Marxism as dogma.” See Sartre, “Merleau-Ponty,” trans. Chris Tucker, in *We Have Only This Life to Live*, ed. Ronald Aronson and Adrian van den Hoven (New York: New York Review Books, 2013), 317. He says a few pages later that Merleau-Ponty was “a Marxist for want or anything better” (319).

¹¹ Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism*, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 17.

¹² Sartre, *Search for a Method*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Vintage, 1968), 8, 181.

Michel Contat that if a label is absolutely necessary he would prefer “existentialist” to “Marxist.”¹³

Sartre’s early phenomenological ontology was severely criticized by several prominent Marxists of his day,¹⁴ and his later attempt at a “synthesis” of existentialism and Marxism was attacked from both the left and the right as philosophically indefensible.¹⁵ Later evaluations have been more nuanced and generous in their assessment of this “Marxist existentialism.”¹⁶ Tracing the outlines of Sartre’s evolving position on the relationship between the two “isms” that defined his intellectual career is important for understanding his views on political violence, especially as manifested in *Dirty Hands*. The first distinction that must be made is between Official Communism—i.e., the politics of the PCF and the U.S.S.R. during Sartre’s lifetime—and Marxist theory. Now, within the latter there must also be distinctions. Does Marxist theory equate to a “reductionist” understanding of culture that cashes out in a teleological “end of history”? Or is it, rather, a critique of society that diagnoses systematic relations of material domination and exploitation with the aim of realizing an emancipatory future in which human beings will no longer be alienated from their own relations of production? To what extent do or can these two conceptions overlap? This is not the place to answer these questions. But where

¹³ Sartre, “Self Portrait at Seventy,” in *Life/Situations*, trans. Paul Auster and Lydia Davis (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 60.

¹⁴ See Georg Lukács, “Existentialism,” trans. Henry F. Mins, in *Marxism and Human Liberation*, ed. E. San Juan Jr. (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1973), 243-266. See also Herbert Marcuse, “Sartre’s Existentialism,” in *The Essential Marcuse*, ed. Andrew Feenberg and William Leiss (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007), 128-158.

¹⁵ Raymond Aron is referring to his contemporary and erstwhile friend when he writes that “a follower of Kierkegaard cannot at the same time be a follower of Marx.” See *Marxism and the Existentialists*, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 30. Cf. George Novack: “The confrontation of Existentialism with dialectical materialism is a genuine case of ‘either-or.’ But Sartre wants to embrace Kierkegaard with his right hand and Marx with his left, without choosing between them.” See *Existentialism versus Marxism* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1966), 49.

¹⁶ See Thomas R. Flynn, *Sartre and Marxist Existentialism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), or James Miller, *History and Human Existence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 139-196. In one of the first books to take up the subject, Wilfred Desan concludes that Sartre is ultimately too much of a “Cartesian” to be a true Marxist. See *The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965), 306-309.

Sartre is concerned, we will see shortly that from the outset he sympathized with the latter articulation and was suspicious of the former.

By way of initial orientation we can look to the early essay “Materialism and Revolution,” the basic thesis of which Sartre never repudiated. The piece is a polemic directed against the philosophical scaffolding of Official Communism as represented by such ideologues as Roger Garaudy (who would once again become a target in *Search for a Method*). In a footnote on the first page, Sartre clarifies the scope of the essay: “my criticisms are not directed against [Marx], but against the Marxist scholasticism of 1949. Or, if you prefer, against Marx *through* Neo-Stalinist Marxism.”¹⁷ This “scholasticism” refers to a theoretical orientation which assumes a mechanistic, deterministic, and necessitarian theory of history, politics, and culture. It has taken on many names in the literature—“orthodox Marxism” and “reductionist Marxism” are common. Sartre, for better or worse, refers to it as “materialism.” This orientation maintains—at least in the form under consideration here—that the course of human events is inexorably determined by the objective forces of the economic/political process; categories like “subjectivity” and “freedom” are only footnotes to the mechanistic movements of the economic base, only pawns in the chess game that is History. Sartre argues that this conception, which ostensibly presents itself as a service to the proletarian revolution, is actually a dogma incompatible with the very idea of revolution. Individual and collective human agency that chooses itself in situation is a necessary condition for revolutionary praxis, and this requires an account of subjectivity as something more than a function of impersonal, pre-determined mechanisms. It requires, also, an account of the Party as something *less* than the indisputable vehicle of emancipation. Official Communism demands revolutionary praxis, but at the same time denies that revolutionary praxis is anything

¹⁷ Sartre, “Materialism and Revolution,” in *Literary and Philosophical Essays*, trans. Annette Michelson (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), 185f.

but the necessary result of “objective conditions.” It calls for a commitment that dissolves the motives for this very commitment, and substitutes a dogmatic adherence to an architectonic system and politics for a critical judgment freely chosen in a given situation:

I know that our intellectual interest lies with the proletariat. Is that a reason for me to demand of my thinking, which has led to this point, that it destroy itself? Is that a reason for me to force it henceforth to abandon its criteria, to think in contradictions, to be torn between incompatible theses, to lose even the clear consciousness of itself, to launch forth blindly in a giddy flight that leads to faith?¹⁸

We can see here that Sartre is sympathetic to (some form of) a Marxist outlook and to the prospect of revolution. He wants to acknowledge, however, “what is involved in everyone’s relinquishing the right to free criticism, the right to facts, the right to truth.”¹⁹ This renunciation of criticism is the result, he thinks, of the “naïve and stubborn scientism”²⁰ of Garaudy, of the “materialism” of Official Communism. “[H]ave I fallen into the unacceptable dilemma of betraying the proletariat in order to serve truth or betraying truth in the name of the proletariat?”²¹ This is the dilemma presented by an ideology that appeals to a subject to decline the category of subjectivity. But there is also a practical, methodological concern in Sartre’s thesis: if we are concerned with revolution, the image to cultivate is not one of the human subject as a cog in the world-historical machine, but of this subject as a freedom capable of transcending its given conditions, i.e., an existentialist, “humanist” image:

What the revolutionary demands is the possibility for man to invent his own law. This is the basis of his humanism and of his socialism. He does not, deep within himself, think—at least so long as he is not being tricked—that socialism waits for him around history’s bend, like a bandit with a cudgel, concealed somewhere in the woods.²²

So what does “Materialism and Revolution” tell us about Sartre’s relation to Marxism?

To be sure, some would read the piece and conclude that Sartre is not a Marxist at all, or even

¹⁸ Sartre, “Materialism and Revolution,” 207.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 207.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 239.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 207.

²² *Ibid.*, 237.

that he is a raving anti-Marxist (this is certainly how the piece was received by the PCF). But we must remember the footnote at the outset of the essay: it is *not* about Marx or Marxism “as such”, but about the form Marxism had taken in cold war politics. Sartre declares his allegiance to the class struggle, to the overcoming of capitalism, and to the communist revolution. He declines, however, to root this allegiance in an absolutist teleology of historical progression, or in a form of materialism that reduces human subjectivity, freedom, and choice to the interplay of blind and law-like structures or in an unconditional allegiance to the politics of the Party.²³ We can see this articulation in many places in Sartre’s early work. In “Existentialism: A Clarification,” for instance:

The class struggle is a fact to which I subscribe completely, but how can you fail to see that it is situated on the level of freedom? You call us social traitors, saying that our conception of freedom keeps man from loosening his chains. What stupidity! When we say a man who’s out of work is free, we don’t mean that he can do whatever he wants and change himself into a rich and tranquil bourgeois on the spot. *He is free because he can always choose to accept his lot with resignation or rebel against it.*²⁴

Or in “Introducing *Les Temps modernes*”:

Man, who may be explained simultaneously by so many causes, is nevertheless alone in bearing the burden of himself. In this sense, freedom might appear to be a curse; it is a curse. But it is also the sole source of human greatness. On this score, the Marxists will agree with us in spirit, if not in letter, since as far as I know they are not reluctant to issue moral condemnations.²⁵

As early as *The Transcendence of the Ego*, one of his first published works, we find such passages as this: “I have always thought that such a fertile working hypothesis as historical

²³ Cf. Sartre’s early critic, Herbert Marcuse: “[I]t would be a distortion of the entire significance of Marxian theory to argue from the inexorable necessity that governs the development of capitalism to a similar necessity in the matter of transformation into socialism [...] There can be no blind necessity in tendencies that terminate in a free and self-conscious society [...] Not the slightest natural necessity or automatic inevitability guarantees the transition from capitalism to socialism.” See *Reason and Revolution* (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 1999), 317-318.

²⁴ Sartre, “Existentialism: A Clarification,” trans. Richard McCleary, in *We Have Only This Life to Live*, 90. See also: “[Existentialism] isn’t too far from the conception of man found in Marx. For is it not a fact that Marx would accept *this motto of ours for man: make, and in making, make yourself, and be nothing but what you have made of yourself?*” (88).

²⁵ Sartre, “Introducing *Les Temps modernes*,” trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, in *We Have Only This Life to Live*, 142-143.

materialism in no way required as a basis the absurdity of metaphysical materialism.”²⁶ Even when Sartre became an avowed “fellow traveler” with “The Communists and Peace,” he still maintained this theoretical independence: “The purpose of this article is to declare my agreement with the Communists on precise and limited subjects, reasoning from *my* principles and not from *theirs*.”²⁷ This is, in fact, the main criticism that Merleau-Ponty launches against his colleague in *Adventures of the Dialectic*—that the latter’s support for Official Communism is disingenuous insofar as his philosophical commitments are antithetical to theirs: “His principles are, in truth, not only different from those of the communists, they are practically opposed to them.”²⁸ As we will see later, Sartre would come to accept this point. In the last phase of his political thinking, he once again assumes an openly antagonistic posture with regard to Official Communism even as his expression of a certain form of existentialist-tinged Marxism becomes stronger and more sophisticated. In *Search for a Method* he says that the ideology of Official Communism has “left us stranded” and “come to a stop,”²⁹ calling for a serious re-evaluation of its basic premises: “Marxism ought to study real men in depth, not dissolve them in a bath of sulphuric acid.”³⁰ The culmination of the later period is the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* which, as Sartre tells Michel Contat, is “a Marxist work written against the Communists.”³¹

For all we have said, then, we are still not in a position to give a conclusive answer to the question: “Is Sartre a true Marxist?” It is difficult to read pieces like “On the American Working

²⁶ Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, trans. Andrew Brown (London: Routledge, 2004), 51.

²⁷ Sartre, *The Communists and Peace*, trans. Martha H. Fletcher and John R. Kleinschmidt (New York: George Braziller: 1968), 68.

²⁸ Merleau-Ponty, *Adventures of the Dialectic*, trans. Joseph Bien (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 97.

²⁹ Sartre, *Search for a Method*, 21.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 44.

³¹ Sartre, “Self Portrait at Seventy,” 18.

Class”³² or certain passages in *Anti-Semite and Jew*³³ and answer unconditionally in the negative. Ultimately, however, whether or not Sartre’s point of view counts as “true Marxism” will depend upon one’s definition and interpretation of this term. Beauvoir sums up the issue with her usual succinctness: “[Sartre] believes in certain contradictions in capitalism that, by making the situation of the exploited classes intolerable, turns the society in which we live into an inhuman society.”³⁴ Are we in the presence of a Marxist? As with most philosophical “isms,” it depends what we mean. We are at least in the presence of an intellectual for whom Marxism is an issue.

We have so far dealt only with Sartre’s relation to Marxist theory. But *Dirty Hands* is about political violence, which, though evidently a topic one can consider theoretically, is ultimately a question of action and practice. To go further, we must take up this concrete problem as it existed for Sartre. It is best approached in the context of two related but distinct debates, one with Merleau-Ponty and one with Camus, which I will now consider in turn.

Critics and Comrades: Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on Koestler’s Dilemma

Sartre’s intellectual relationship with Merleau-Ponty from their co-founding of *Les Temps modernes* until the latter’s death was one of mutual influence, mutual correction, and mutual reproach. In each case, disagreements on ontology or phenomenological method were secondary to questions of political concern. In Sartre’s “eulogy” for Merleau-Ponty, he focuses almost exclusively on their convergences and divergences with regard to politics and says very little about “philosophy proper.”³⁵ It was this subject that would lead to the dissolution of their

³² See Sartre, “On the American Working Class,” trans. Adrian van den Hoven, in *We Have Only This Life to Live*, 92-114.

³³ See Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, trans. George J. Becker (New York: Schocken Books, 1948), 36-37, 148-149.

³⁴ Simone de Beauvoir, “Merleau-Ponty and Pseudo-Sartreanism,” trans. Véronique Zaytzeff and Frederick M. Morrison, in *Political Writings*, ed. Margaret A. Simons and Marybeth Timmermann (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012), 242.

³⁵ See Sartre, “Merleau-Ponty,” 310-383.

personal friendship and to Merleau-Ponty resigning from *Les Temps modernes* in 1953. The debate was multi-faceted and complex, and we cannot give an exhaustive account here. For our purposes, it will suffice to discuss their mutually evolving perspectives on one aspect of divergence, which I will call, following Merleau-Ponty, “Koestler’s dilemma.” Here is one way of framing the controversy: to what extent may one criticize Official Communism—either its theory or its practice—without lapsing into liberal bourgeois apologetics and/or supplying ammunition to the non-communist left or anti-communist right? In other words, how is it possible to be both a critic and a comrade?³⁶ Because there is a broader and more abstract theoretical problem lying behind this practical one, and because the latter is no longer a “live issue” for us today (there is no more “Official Communism”), I will refer to this formulation as the *foreground question*. The philosophical *background question*, expressed with a particular content in the Sartre/Merleau-Ponty debate, can be articulated this way: to what extent can or should an emancipatory, revolutionary politics be informed by or predicated on a *humanist* value-system? Over the course of their reflections, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty vacillate between speaking in the voice of the comrade and in that of the critic. The voice of the comrade says that we must support the revolutionary Party at whatever cost, its problems notwithstanding—or, with regard to the background question, that we must bracket humanist considerations in the name of political exigency. The voice of the critic argues (foreground question) that certain tendencies of Official Communism—i.e., its anti-humanist tendencies—serve to undermine the principles of the movement, and we must criticize these even at the cost of immediate political necessities. The critic suggests (background question) that if we relinquish all claims to humanism in the name of exigency we have done damage to the cause that animated the

³⁶ This is one of the central problems faced by the characters in Beauvoir’s epic *roman à clef*, *The Mandarins*, trans. Leonard M. Friedman (New York: Norton, 1991), 321, 407.

revolution in the first place—human emancipation and human freedom. In “Materialism and Revolution,” as we have seen, Sartre speaks unmistakably as critic.

Koestler’s dilemma is so named for Arthur Koestler’s *Darkness at Noon*, a thinly veiled allegory of Stalin’s purges and the Moscow Show Trials of 1936. It provoked a kind of crisis of conscience for the Marxist/communist intelligentsia of the time and brought political clout to the anti-communist reaction.³⁷ Koestler’s basic observation is that, as the Soviet regime became increasingly totalitarian, the very emancipatory ideals that motivated revolutionary praxis were betrayed in the process of achieving them. Any vestige of the emancipatory intentions of Marxism was sacrificed through political terror and ideological dogma. I will cite one passage from the novel—notice the similarity to Sartre’s tone in “Materialism and Revolution”:

The Party denied the free will of the individual—and at the same time it exacted his willing self-sacrifice. It denied his capacity to choose between two alternatives—and at the same time it demanded that he should constantly choose the right one. It denied his power to distinguish good and evil—and at the same time it spoke pathetically of guilt and treachery. The individual stood under the sign of economic fatality, a wheel in a clockwork which had been wound up for all eternity and could not be stopped or influenced—and the Party demanded that the wheel should revolt against the clockwork and change its course. There was somewhere an error in the calculation; the equation did not work out.³⁸

Merleau-Ponty’s *Humanism and Terror* is a response to the moral and political challenge issued by Koestler’s book. Taking a staunch “comrade” position, he points out the extent to which Koestler’s appeal to humanism can be used for purposes in opposition to revolutionary communism and in support of the bourgeois liberal order, an order that is only *nominally* humanist: “principles and the inner life are alibis the moment they cease to animate external and everyday life. A regime which is nominally liberal can be oppressive in reality. A regime which acknowledges its violence *might* have in it more genuine humanity.”³⁹ He wants to maintain the “humanist intentions” of the revolutionary project, but insists that illiberal means are justified

³⁷ See *The Mandarins* again, 356.

³⁸ Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon* (New York: Scribner, 2006), 262.

³⁹ Merleau-Ponty, *Humanism and Terror*, trans. John O’Neil (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), xiv-xv.

insofar as they are combating a nominally liberal but concretely oppressive situation in order to bring about a better future. As long as we criticize Official Communism in the name of humanism, we grant an “alibi” to the everyday, accepted violence of the prevailing system. A critical adherence to liberal values may conflict with the necessities of the revolutionary apparatus, and if we are committed to the latter it may be necessary to bracket the former. Merleau-Ponty seems to realize that the Soviet Union had lost sight of its original ends, at least to a certain extent, but says that we must nevertheless choose sides; in walking the precarious tightrope between liberal apologetics and Official Communism, we have to fall on one side or the other:

We find ourselves in an inextricable situation. The Marxist critique of capitalism is still valid and it is clear that anti-Sovietism today resembles the brutality, hubris, vertigo, and anguish that already found expression in fascism. On the other side, the Revolution has come to a halt: it maintains and aggravates the dictatorial apparatus while renouncing the revolutionary liberty of the proletariat in the Soviets and its Party and abandoning the humane control of the state. It is impossible to be an anti-Communist and it is not possible to be a Communist.⁴⁰

In sum, the book is a qualified and apprehensive defense of the Moscow Show Trials—“convoluted and uneasy apologetics,” as Tony Judt calls it.⁴¹ This does not mean that Merleau-Ponty gives *carte blanche* approval to political terror. Rather, he recognizes the stakes involved in the revolutionary state and in criticizing it. “Cunning, deception, bloodshed, and dictatorship are justified if they bring the proletariat into power,” he says, “and to that extent alone.”⁴² Terror may be deplorable, but it may be part of a revolutionary project that opposes an objectively deplorable form of life and points the way to a different one. It is possible, so long as we do not compromise the revolution by criticizing it in the name of the values of the liberal world, that measures like the Show Trials will only be a “detour.” Today, we might say that Merleau-Ponty mistook a wrong turn for an indirect course.

⁴⁰ Ibid, xxi.

⁴¹ Tony Judt, *Marxism and the French Left* (New York: NYU Press, 2011), 187.

⁴² Merleau-Ponty, “Humanism and Terror,” xviii-xix.

Sartre said that he was “converted” to Marxism by Merleau-Ponty and that it was *Humanism and Terror* that caused him to “take the plunge.”⁴³ In the book-length essay *The Communists and Peace* he takes up the Manichean view of the “comrade” established by his colleague. His basic thesis is that Official Communism represents the only visible avenue for a proletarian revolution and must be categorically supported as such: “Historically the proletariat’s chance, its ‘example,’ the source of ‘the power of revolutionary penetration’ is the U.S.S.R. [...] The Soviet Union is *in itself* a historic value to be defended [...] we must indissolubly associate the Soviet cause with that of the proletariat.”⁴⁴ The violence associated with the U.S.S.R. must be understood on the basis of its status as the site of (at least potential) emancipation. The standards of humanism applicable to the current form of society cannot be applied to it. The revolutionary movement is indeed predicated on a form of humanism, but not the liberal humanism of Koestler which shrinks before the necessity of political violence:

[T]he worker is answerable to a historic right which doesn’t yet exist and may never exist; from the point of view of a future society which will be born thanks to his efforts, his violence is a positive humanism. Seen in our present society, it is in part a right and in part a crime. In fact, humanism and violence are the two indissoluble aspects of his effort to go beyond the condition of an oppressed being.⁴⁵

Sartre’s answer to the political foreground question, then, is that Official Communism must remain above reproach as long as it remains revolutionary. With regard to the philosophical background question, he insists that humanism has limited currency in certain objective conditions; until these are transformed, by whatever means necessary, we cannot countenance appeals to the humanism of the bourgeois liberal world. To avoid any counterrevolutionary

⁴³ Sartre, “Merleau-Ponty,” 329, 331.

⁴⁴ Sartre, *The Communists and Peace*, 12.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 54-55. The category of “structural violence” in Sartre has of late received some positive critical attention. See Michael Fleming, “Sartre on Violence: Not So Ambivalent?” in *Sartre Studies International* 17, no. 1 (2011), 20-40.

politics, we must grant the PCF infallibility, and, for the same reason, hold humanism in abeyance.⁴⁶

Shortly before and during the publication of *The Communists and Peace*, Merleau-Ponty became decisively disillusioned with the politics of Official Communism (this is usually attributed to the behavior of the U.S.S.R. during the Korean War). Already in short essays like “Marxism and Superstition” published not long after *Humanism and Terror*, he had begun criticizing Official Communism for its infidelity to the framework of historical materialism, arguing that there was nothing Marxist about dogmatism and fanaticism.⁴⁷ By *Adventures of the Dialectic* he is in full “critic” mode, responding directly to Sartre’s position in *The Communists and Peace*. He claims that the interdict against immanent criticism established by Official Communism—and the dogmatic and violent politics that results—have rendered the revolutionary project no longer worthy of that name:

This new dogmatism, which puts the knowing subject outside the fabric of history and gives it access to absolute being, releases it from the duty of self-criticism, exempts Marxism from applying its own principles to itself, and settles dialectical thought, which by its own movement rejected it, in a massive positivity.⁴⁸

To jettison or to bracket the critical, humanistic component of Marxist theory is to annul the historical materialist dialectic—to cancel, to negate (and not in the sense of *aufheben*) the original impetus for the movement. The desire to silence all opposition to the revolution lest it

⁴⁶ In his eulogy for Merleau-Ponty, Sartre further articulates the Manichaeism that was in the air at this time: “To attack the U.S.S.R. alone was to absolve the West.” “However inadmissible their politics might be, we could not distance ourselves from [the communists]—at least in our old capitalist countries—without resolving on some sort of betrayal.” See Sartre, “Merleau-Ponty,” 339-341. Also worth noting are Sartre’s letters to Merleau-Ponty around this time: “[T]he statements that you made, if not against me, then at least against my present position, have their immediate resonance *on the right* and take on an objective meaning which there can be no mistaking.” See “Philosophy and Political Engagement: Letters from the Quarrel between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty,” trans. John Stewart, in *The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty*, ed. Jon Stewart (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 332.

⁴⁷ Merleau-Ponty, “Marxism and Superstition,” in *Signs*, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 261-262.

⁴⁸ Merleau-Ponty, *Adventures of the Dialectic*, 60.

destroy the revolution has itself destroyed the revolution. This is Merleau-Ponty's response to the foreground question, and he has a corresponding answer to the background question:

[P]recisely if the future is to be made, not to be contemplated, Marxism has no transcendent view at its disposal to justify its action and [...] therefore, terror must open onto a "humanistic perspective" and revolutionary action must announce this future by certain unchallengeable signs in order that one may speak of a Marxist and revolutionary politics. It is just this confrontation of terror with a humanistic perspective that until now has been lacking in Sartre's studies.⁴⁹

Sartre had maintained that Official Communism must be supported automatically insofar as it remains revolutionary. Merleau-Ponty's response is that an institution that must be supported automatically is as such no longer revolutionary. To be a critic is the best way to be a comrade.⁵⁰

Aronson and Flynn have pointed out that Sartre was profoundly affected by Merleau-Ponty's critique, and that his late political work (beginning with *Search for a Method* and continuing in *Critique of Dialectical Reason*) is heavily indebted to *Adventures of the Dialectic*.⁵¹ Just as *Humanism and Terror* had converted him into a "comrade," Merleau-Ponty's later work may have converted Sartre again, this time back into a "critic." Returning to themes established in "Materialism and Revolution," *Search for a Method* argues that "existentialist" humanism as a philosophical moment is parasitic on a certain form of life, one that Marxism has correctly diagnosed, but it is a moment that is with us nevertheless, a moment that we must live in the present. For this reason and for others, the nullification of the categories of criticism and subjectivity for the benefit of revolutionary politics is detrimental to its own project. At the same time, we cannot allow humanism to reify or hypostatize; the idea is "not to reject Marxism in the

⁴⁹ Ibid, 134. We might add that this perspective is also lacking in *Humanism and Terror*.

⁵⁰ There is more than one way of reading the move from *Humanism and Terror* to *Adventures of the Dialectic*. For two interestingly contrasting views, see Bernard Flynn, "The Development of the Political Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty: Humanism and the Rejection of Terror," in *Continental Philosophy Review* 40 (2007): 125-138, and Jérôme Melançon, "Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Politics: A Humanism in Extension," in *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 36 (2010): 623-634.

⁵¹ See Ronald Aronson, "Vicissitudes of the Dialectic: From Merleau-Ponty's *Adventures of the Dialectic* to Sartre's Second *Critique*," in *The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty*, 233-269, and Thomas R. Flynn, "Merleau-Ponty and the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*," in the same volume, 270-278.

name of an idealist humanism, but to reconquer man within Marxism.”⁵² Sartre’s ultimate solution to the background question of Koestler’s dilemma is to fold humanism (or existentialism) into a Marxist political project without simply suspending it. We must take up and develop the category of existentialist humanism in the process of going beyond it. With regard to the foreground question, Sartre finally arrives at the conclusion that Official Communism must be criticized even at the cost of anti-capitalist politics losing ground; this was after Sartre’s own disillusionment with the Soviet regime following the bloody repression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956. As quoted above, he conceived his later political writings as “Marxist work written against the Communists.”

Koestler’s dilemma is ultimately a question of what could be called the politics of violence. In the various works discussed here, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty debate on the appropriate reaction to the institutionalized violence of Official Communism, and, on a broader level, on the place of humanism in a revolutionary project. The politics of violence operates on the “comrade” view elaborated above, the Manichean refusal to denounce abuses of humanist principles as long as they are committed by the right Party. As we have seen, both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty reject this position in the end. This does not mean, however, that Sartre is content to censure political violence as such. This brings us to his debate with Camus.

Rebels and Assassins, Sartre v. Camus

Because so much has been written on the Sartre/Camus break, this section will be brief.⁵³

The long-brewing confrontation came to a head when *Les Temps modernes* published a scathing

⁵² Sartre, *Search for a Method*, 83.

⁵³ For a concise summary, see Sprintzen et al., “Historical and Critical Introduction: From Friendship to Rivals,” in *Sartre and Camus: A Historic Confrontation*, ed and trans. David A. Sprintzen and Adrian van den Hoven (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2004), 31-76.

review—commissioned by Sartre and written by Francis Jeanson—of Camus’s political treatise *The Rebel*. The basic thesis of the book is that rebellion against an established order always entails an implicit moral approbation: “Not every value entails rebellion, but every act of rebellion tacitly invokes a value.”⁵⁴ An oppositional movement based on (however surreptitious) a moral impulse must become conscious of and maintain fidelity to this impulse in its activities. Therefore, revolutionary political violence is unjustifiable as long as its legitimacy is borrowed from an only-postulated future state. There can be no terror on credit. With this argument in hand, Camus declines Marxist/Communist politics and opts for a center-left reformism.

Jeanson’s review attacked *The Rebel* as reactionary and idealist, a liberal mystification of present conditions vouchsafed by the defeatist, essentializing metaphysical perspective of *The Myth of Sisyphus*.⁵⁵ In his angry “Letter to the Editor of *Les Temps modernes*,” Camus reiterates his position:

[W]hoever seeks to serve history for its own sake ends in nihilism. He would then have tried to demonstrate that history can on its own provide values that are not exclusively those of force or else tried to prove that one can act in history without appealing to any value [...] One cannot rise up in the name of nothing.⁵⁶

Sartre’s “Reply to Albert Camus” argues that the liberal reformism of *The Rebel* overlooks the systematic, structural forms of oppression endemic to the capitalist world, a world that was created and is sustained by violence and that is not going to change by means of polite politics. Camus’s liberalism gives “a clear conscience to the privileged,”⁵⁷ forgetting that the humanism of the bourgeois order is cold comfort to the dispossessed. “Your morality [...] changed into moralism,” he reproaches Camus. “Today it is only literature. Tomorrow perhaps it

⁵⁴ Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), 14.

⁵⁵ Francis Jeanson, “Albert Camus, or The Soul in Revolt,” in *Sartre and Camus: A Historic Confrontation*, 79-105.

⁵⁶ Camus, “A Letter to the Editor of *Les Temps modernes*,” in *ibid*, 116, 124. Interestingly, Camus does not respond to the part of Jeanson’s critique dealing with the metaphysical assumptions of *The Myth of Sisyphus*.

⁵⁷ Sartre, “Reply to Albert Camus,” in *ibid*, 139.

will be immorality.”⁵⁸ This piece was, it must be said, written around the time of *The Communists and Peace*, but a reading of Sartre’s preface to Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth* suffices to show that his position on political violence *as such* did not become more Camusian after *Search for a Method*.⁵⁹

The literary counterpart to *The Rebel* is Camus’s play “*The Just Assassins*,” a morality tale (and true story) about a cadre of Russian conspirators who plot to assassinate a Duke amidst crises of conscience and conflicts over humanist scruples.⁶⁰ It is customary to read *The Just Assassins* against Sartre’s play *The Devil and the Good Lord*,⁶¹ but it could also be related to *Dirty Hands* (Camus’s play was staged one year after the latter). Hugo, like Camus’s assassins, has deep reservations and disquiet about his task of political violence. Unlike them, however, he does not end in disconsolate lamentation but in a rejuvenated conviction about the significance of his action: “A man like Hoederer doesn’t die by accident. He dies for his ideas, for his political program; he’s responsible for his death.”⁶² As tortured as he is to go through with it, he recognizes that his act of violence was committed against a larger, totalizing system of violence. In fact, neither Hugo nor Hoederer would subscribe to the view of *The Rebel*; they would see through what Sartre considered to be its naïveté. Failing the intervention of Benjamin’s “divine violence,”⁶³ radical politics means getting one’s hands dirty. We saw that Sartre’s (initial) disagreement with Merleau-Ponty concerned the politics of violence. We could say in turn that

⁵⁸ Ibid, 158.

⁵⁹ In his assessment of the Sartre/Camus debate, Aronson argues that while Camus is unable to understand “structural violence,” Sartre is unable to appreciate the moral cost of political violence. See “Camus and Sartre on Violence—the Unresolved Conflict.” I do not think this is quite right; Hugo may be the most morally tortured character Sartre ever created—which is saying a lot.

⁶⁰ Camus, *The Just Assassins*, in *Caligula and Three Other Plays*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Random House, 1958), 233-302.

⁶¹ See Aronson, “Camus and Sartre on Violence—the Unresolved Conflict,” 72, and Sprintzen et al., 60. O’Donohoe, whom I discuss below, is an exception.

⁶² Sartre, *Dirty Hands*, 241.

⁶³ See Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” trans. Edmund Jephcott, in *Selected Writings vol. 1, 1913-1926*, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 236-252.

his disagreement with Camus is about the violence of the political. Camus's liberalism, Sartre thinks, crucially misses the fact that politics always contains a violent element, and that the disavowal of political violence only serves to perpetuate the structural violence of the status quo. But what I have just said about the conclusion of *Dirty Hands* presupposes some lines of interpretation that have yet to be established. So, with everything said about Sartre's relationship with Marxism, Merleau-Ponty, and Camus, I turn back to consider the meaning of the play.

***Dirty Hands* Reconsidered**

The mature form of Sartre's brand of Marxism and communist politics requires an adherence to some form of humanism, one which rejects the institutional violence of Official Communism and, ultimately, the Manichaeism of "The Communists and Peace" without by that token sacrificing a commitment to the communist project or resulting in a liberal abstention from political violence. He denounces what I have referred to as the politics of violence while at the same time recognizing the violence of the political. This position, I suggest, can be taken as the basic allegorical suggestion of "Dirty Hands." As we have seen, the heated debate between Hugo and Hoederer is not about political violence and the abstention therefrom, but about Marxist principles and political exigency. Hoederer represents the politics of violence, and, given the "twist" at the end of the play, Official Communism. He chides Hugo for clinging to his bourgeois "freedom to think,"⁶⁴ and is willing to sacrifice *n'importe quoi* if it means increased power and control for the Party. Hugo cannot accept this kind of thinking ("all means are not good"). But what are Hugo's principles? A categorical commitment to non-violence is clearly not one of them. He is reluctant and squeamish, but accepts the assassination of Hoederer as important for the revolution. The play's title could therefore have two meanings. Hoederer's

⁶⁴ Sartre, *Dirty Hands*, 184.

hands are dirty because of his ruthless manipulation of power, and Hugo's because he murders Hoederer. The former is the context in which the title of the play appears, but notice that it could operate on a dual-level:

Hoederer: How you cling to your purity, young man! How afraid you are to soil your hands! All right, stay pure! What good will it do? Why did you join us? Purity is an idea for a yogi or a monk. You intellectuals and bourgeois anarchists use it for a pretext for doing nothing. To do nothing, to remain motionless, arms at your sides, wearing kid gloves. Well, I have dirty hands. Right up to the elbows. I've plunged them in filth and blood. But what do you hope? Do you think you can govern innocently?⁶⁵

However unbeknownst to him, these lines can be read as Hoederer convincing Hugo to kill him. His argument for the politics of violence can be seen as persuading Hugo as to the violence of the political. Paradoxically, Hoederer also sometimes speaks as if he is against the latter, trading in humanist tones that sound not unlike Camus: "For me, one man more or less in the world is something that counts. It's something precious."⁶⁶ He does not seem to notice the incompatibility of this position with his kind of praxis. In the end, Hugo maintains his rejection of Hoederer's politics—and by extension the politics of the Party—but does not regret killing him. He overcomes his bourgeois liberal reluctance to get his hands dirty, but refuses to countenance uncritical opportunism and opts to die rather than submit to the dogmas and duplicities of Official Communism.

This line of interpretation presupposes that Sartre agrees and identifies with Hugo. O'Donohoe argues exactly the opposite, claiming that Sartre "seems to subscribe" to Hoederer's position and that Hugo is "implicitly condemned."⁶⁷ He points out that Sartre's initial "embargo" of the play following the harsh communist reaction confirms this reading; evidently, Sartre had not wanted to produce a play critical of communism. It is true also that Sartre made several

⁶⁵ Ibid, 218.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 220.

⁶⁷ Benedict O'Donohoe, "Revolution or Revolt? *Les Mains Sales* and *Les Justes*," in *Sartre Studies International* 18, no. 2 (2012), 82-85. Cf. remarks by Ronald Santoni, *Sartre on Violence: Curiously Ambivalent* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2003), 109-115.

public statements around the premiere of the play indicating that he prefers Hoederer's position to Hugo's. As Bratu points out, however, he made equally as many comments expressing sympathy with Hugo and several more simply refusing to "take sides."⁶⁸ His public relationship to the play was nothing if not ambivalent. One important aspect ignored by O'Donohoe is the callous, treacherous nature of the Party's behavior at the end of the play. It does not come away looking particularly attractive. The embargo must also be understood in the context of the play's reception. It was heralded by the rightist press and denounced as anti-communist by the left. Even if I am right about the play's meaning, this was certainly not what Sartre had meant it to accomplish. It must be remembered also that it was staged the same year that he co-founded the *Rassemblement démocratique révolutionnaire*, a radical leftist party that was independent of the PCF. The fact that Sartre was involved with a party that opposed both Official Communism and liberal reformism at the time of "Dirty Hands" lends some support to my reading, even if it does not prove it. During his period of fellow-travelling around the time of *The Communists and Peace*, the play stayed on the shelf. After his definitive break with Official Communism, however, it was staged in Czechoslovakia as an anti-Soviet protest piece—with Sartre's permission and support.⁶⁹ Why this vacillation?

Whatever his original intentions, by the end of Sartre's intellectual evolution *vis à vis* Marxism and communism he had arrived at the perspective of Hugo in *Dirty Hands*. In the end, Hugo rejects Official Communism in the name of critical Marxist principles, denouncing the politics of violence while acknowledging the violence of the political. This, essentially, is what Sartre does at the end of his dialectical journey. He said that the *Critique* was "a Marxist work

⁶⁸ See Christian Bratu, "Political Violence and/as Evil: Sartre's *Dirty Hands*," in *Evil in Contemporary French and Francophone Literature*, ed. Scott M. Powers (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 18-22.

⁶⁹ See Simone de Beauvoir, *Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre*, trans. Patrick O'Brien (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 370.

written against the Communists.”⁷⁰ This, I suggest, is also the way to characterize “Dirty Hands.” Ultimately, Sartre himself became “unsalvageable” and pronounced the same verdict on Official Communism. Of course, one interpretation cannot be definitive, and Sartre’s statements in support of Hoederer should be counted. One could get a very different sense from considering the work alongside *The Communists and Peace* as opposed to *Search for a Method*. In fact, we can read *Dirty Hands* in several different ways, depending on what stage of Sartre’s political thinking is in question; as the philosopher’s thought changes, so does the meaning of his play. This is evidenced by his changing relationship to it. As his stance toward Official Communism became increasingly cold, *Dirty Hands* assumed the meaning that was originally attributed to it. “A Marxist work against the communists” *became* what the play is about. Correspondingly, we can say that the play illustrates Sartre’s final position on political violence: an anti-Manichean opposition to the politics of violence and an apprehensive but ultimately convinced acknowledgment of the violence of the political.

⁷⁰ Sartre, “Self Portrait at Seventy,” 18.

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